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Abstract 
Societies are severely divided by ethnicity, race, religion, language, or any other form of 
ascriptive affiliation, ethnic divisions that make democracy difficult, because they tend to 
produce ethnic parties and ethnic voting. Two commonly proposed methods of 
amelioration are called consociational and centripetal. Three problems derive from these 
proposals: The first concerns the adoptability of either of the two principal prescriptions. 
Under what conditions can either be adopted? The second relates to a possibility 
inherent in centripetal regimes: the potential degradation of the electoral arrangements 
that sustain the interethnic coalition. The third, derives from a common consequence of 
the adoption of a consociational regime: Where robust guarantees, including minority 
vetoes, are adopted, immobilism is a strong possibility, and it may be very difficult to 
overcome the stasis that immobilism can produce. By examining these three problems, 
we can uncover some of the frailties inherent in both of the common prescriptions. 
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A. Introduction 
Societies are severely divided by ethnicity, race, religion, 
language, or any other form of ascriptive affiliation, ethnic divisions that 
make democracy difficult, because they tend to produce ethnic parties 
and ethnic voting. An ethnic party with a majority of votes and seats can 
dominate minority groups, seemingly in perpetuity. Some version of this 
problem informs the politics of a great many severely divided societies.2 
In severely divided societies with ethnically based parties, ordinary 
majority rule usually results in ethnic domination. 
Two commonly proposed methods of amelioration are called 
consociational and centripetal. Consociationalists generally try to solve the 
problem by establishing a regime of agreed guarantees, including proportional 
group participation in government and minority vetoes of ethnically sensitive 
policies. Their solution is to replace the adversary democracy of government 
and opposition with a grand coalition of majorities and minorities. By contrast, 
centripetalists do not propose to substitute a consensual regime for majority 
rule, but attempt instead to create incentives, principally electoral incentives, 
for moderates to compromise on conflicting group claims, to form interethnic 
coalitions, and to establish a regime of interethnic majority rule. 
Both consociationalists and centripetalists presuppose that ethnic 
groups in severely divided societies will be represented by ethnically based 
parties. The goal of both is interethnic power sharing. Their differences lie in 
contrasting conceptions of the best governing arrangements for such societies. 
Consociationalists aim at mandatory postelectoral governing coalitions of all 
____________ 
2 Under other circumstances, ethnic minorities can dominate majorities, with quite 
explosive consequences, as in Syria. 
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ethnic antagonists who find their way into parliament through a proportional 
electoral system; centripetalists, by contrast, aim at voluntary preelectoral 
interethnic coalitions of moderates. 
Three problems that derive from these proposals ought to be of 
serious concern but are generally neglected in the literature on interethnic 
political conciliation. The first concerns the adoptability of either of the two 
principal prescriptions. Under what conditions can either be adopted? The 
second relates to a possibility inherent in centripetal regimes: the potential 
degradation of the electoral arrangements that sustain the interethnic coalition. 
The third derives from a common consequence of the adoption of a 
consociational regime: Where robust guarantees, including minority vetoes, 
are adopted, immobilism is a strong possibility, and it may be very difficult to 
overcome the stasis that immobilism can be produced. If we leave aside 
judgments about the relative merits of con-sociationalism and centripetalism 
(see Andrew Reynolds, ed., 2000: 15-54) — although some such judgments will 
inevitably intrude- and deal directly with the three problems, we shall see that 
they do not have really good solutions. By examining them, however, we can 
uncover some of the frailties inherent in both of the common prescriptions. 
A severely divided society is one in which ascriptive cleavages are 
highly salient in politics (more salient than alternative cleavages such as social 
class), a few groups contend for power at the center, and there is a history of 
interethnic antipathy. There are many such societies in Asia, Africa, the Middle 
East, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the Caribbean—the regions 
in which ethnic conflicts tend to be most intense. In these regions, 78 countries 
experienced one or more serious ethnic—conflict incidents between 1980 and 
2010.3 Many of these countries would qualify as severely divided societies. Yet, 
____________ 
3 For sources used to compute these figures, see the Appendix on the Journal of 
Democracy website at www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/supplemental-material. The data were 
gathered with the very diligent research assistance of Asfia Tareen. The nine power-sharing 
arrangements that have endured for more than five years in the regions specified are located in 
Bosnia, Bulgaria, Burundi, Djibouti, Indonesia, Macedonia, Nepal, Nigeria, and Suriname. These 
enumerations are approximations, and some of these cases might be contestable. The point is not to 
create a definitive list but to gain a general sense of the incidence and durability of power-sharing 
arrangements. Needless to say, inclusion on this list does not imply that a country necessarily enjoys 
either a high level of democracy or a high level of interethnic accommodation. 
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in these three decades, only approximately 20 of the 78 managed to conclude 
interethnic power sharing agreements, or reach informal arrangements for 
sharing power across group lines, or adopt regularized power sharing 
practices in the absence of institutions mandating them. This count omits 
agreements that were intended to be merely temporary (for example, Kenya’s 
2008 power-sharing deal), agreements between regimes and rebel formations 
that were not ethnically differentiated, and agreements that merely provided 
for regional autonomy or territorial devolution (or for federalism that 
amounted merely to devolution). The count is meant to capture arrangements 
for interethnic power sharing in the central government.  
In most respects, this count is biased toward finding cases of 
power sharing. All that is required for inclusion is the adoption of at least 
one consociational device or practice, or one centripetal device or practice, 
not a full ensemble of consociational or centripetal institutions. Even so, 
the number of adoptions is not very impressive. Moreover, many such 
agreements were aborted immediately upon adoption, were never 
implemented, or were abandoned within the first three years. Among the 
unimplemented, several resulted in civil war, one in genocide (Rwanda in 
1993), and one in secession (Sudan in 2005). Among the nine that proved 
durable, several eventually yielded fragile, immobile, or un-democratic 
polities with uncertain prospects. Only a handful -between four and six, 
depending on how one chooses to count—could be said to have achieved 
a reasonable degree of sustained power sharing and even among these 
there are some serious political pathologies.  
This article, then, concerns the difficulty of creating durable 
power-sharing institutions. The focus is primarily on cases in which one 
group has a clear majority or a strong plurality, rather than those in which 
an array of groups contend for power, often forming shifting alliances. 
The first section deals with problems of adoption. The second explains 
why centripetal arrangements can degrade over time. The third discusses 
the stalemate that can afflict consociational arrangements and that helps 
to account for their durability and durable stalemate is not what is 
typically intended when groups agree to conciliatory institutions. 
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B. The Adoption Problem 
The adoption problem is surpassingly important. Because the 
obstacles are so many and so complex, I can provide only a taste here.4 A well-
kept secret among proponents of various prescriptions for inter-ethnic 
accommodation is that they are rarely adopted. Moreover, very little thought 
has been given to the conditions under which particular prescriptions for 
severely divided societies can be adopted. 
The adoption problem is really a congeries of bargaining problems. 
A quick but incomplete enumeration should suffice to indicate the obstacles 
to adoption of either consociational or centripetal institutions. 
First, there are asymmetric preferences. Majorities want majority 
rule; minorities want guarantees against majority rule. Consequently, 
minorities may prefer consociation; majorities do not. So a consociational 
regime can be adopted only when majorities (or large pluralities) are 
momentarily weak, often after periods of extended violence. At a later stage, 
when majorities regain their strength, they may overthrow it, as Greek 
Cypriots did in 1963 and as the Hutu in Burundi might be inclined to do 
now. Second, there is general risk-aversion. Ethnic politics is a high-stakes 
game, and there are strong inclinations to stay with what is familiar. 
Third, negotiators do not come to the table innocent and naked. They 
have biases that rule in some models and rule out others. Often they favor 
institutions prevailing in the most successful democracies, which generally 
do not suffer from the most severe ethnic problems, or models derived from 
an ex-colonial power. There are also historical biases that induce decision 
makers to avoid repeating institutional choices that they associate with past 
mistakes, even though their reading of history is contestable or conditions 
may have changed. Biases narrow choices. 
____________ 
4 I have written about the first problem in a preliminary way elsewhere. See Donald L. 
Horowitz, “Constitutional Design: Proposals versus Processes,” in Reynolds, The Architecture of 
Democracy, 15–36; “Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?” No. 42 (2000: 252–84); “Conciliatory 
Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-Conflict States,” William and Mary Law Review 49 
(March 2008: 1213–48). For a brief sampling of some doubts about the likelihood of agreed power sharing, 
see Alexander B. Downes, “The Problem with Negotiated Settlements to Ethnic Civil Wars”, Security 
Studies 13 (Summer 2004: 230–79); Ian S. Spears, “Understanding Inclusive Peace Agreements in Africa: 
The Problems of Sharing Power”, Third World Quarterly 21 (February 2000: 105–18); Spears, “Africa: 
The Limits of Power-Sharing”, Journal of Democracy 13 (July 2002: 123–36). 
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Fourth, there may be visibility of interests, the belief on the part of 
group leaders that they can foresee the relative benefits and costs for their 
group of alternative courses of action. The participants in negotiations may 
think that they know what institutional choices are in their interest, even 
though they may later be proved wrong about those choices (See, for 
example, Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss, 1998: 114-16). 
Generally, the negotiations are not conducted under a veil of ignorance. The 
presumed visibility of interests also narrows choices. 
Fifth is the availability of alternatives. For example, when the 
negotiations for a new dispensation follow an armed insurrection, it may be 
possible for the rebels to withdraw, return to the bush, and fight again, before or 
even after concluding an agreement, if its terms prove to be disadvantageous. 
Attractive alternatives make a durable agreement harder to adopt. 
This list of obstacles to agreement is enough to show why 
agreements to establish political institutions to conciliate ethnic 
conflict are much more rare than they might otherwise be. Many states 
that could benefit from accommodative institutions fail to adopt them. 
Far too little attention has been devoted to the adoption problem. 
More, however, needs to be said about one aspect of the problem. If 
asymmetric preferences mean that majorities will accept a regime of minority 
guarantees only when they are weak, when will they accept a centripetal 
regime? Such a regime rests on the willingness of moderates to appeal, at the 
margin, for the votes of members of groups other than their own and to form 
an interethnic vote-pooling coalition that can fend off challenges from 
monoethnic parties on the extreme flanks. There are two typical occasions for 
the adoption of measures to encourage such behavior. The first occurs when 
outside experts recommend such a regime. This, however, is a rare event, 
because international experts tend, for a variety of reasons, to favor 
proportional electoral systems and consociational guarantees (See Benjamin 
Reilly, 2006: 811-25).5 A more common occurrence is the need of a party of 
the majority group for the votes of the minority. When minority votes are 
____________ 
5 The above can also be seen in Steven I. Wilkinson, “Conditionality, Consociationalism, 
and the European Union”, in Sid Noel, ed., From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict 
Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies (2005: 239-62); A. Carl LeVan, “Power Sharing and 
Inclusive Politics in Africa’s Uncertain Democracies”, Governance 24 (January 2011: 31-53). 
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unusually valuable, generally because the majority is divided between 
parties competing for its vote, it is possible to conclude a centripetal 
arrangement, in which group claims are compromised as votes are pooled 
by the two groups for parties from both. 
A good illustration comes from Malaysia, which long had a regime 
of conciliatory ethnic politics that was repeatedly misclassified as 
consociational.6 Malaysia had no grand coalition, no minority veto, and no 
proportionality -in fact, the Malay majority was greatly advantaged in 
government positions and financial allocations- and it was a thoroughly 
majoritarian democracy, characterized by a vigorous antinomy between 
government and opposition. What Malaysia did have was an interethnic 
coalition (known as the Alliance), flanked by ethnic opposition parties. That 
coalition was formed in the years before independence, when the leading 
Malay party needed votes from the Chinese minority to fend off a 
challenge from a party led by a charismatic Malay politician who had been 
influential in opposing British plans for continued colonial rule after World 
War II (Donal L. Horowitz, 2000: 397-404). The result was a rather durable 
multiethnic coalition (More on the Malaysian case in the next section). 
There is another occasion for the adoption of centripetal institutions—
when there is (as there usually is not) a Rawlsian veil of ignorance surrounding 
the negotiations (John Rawls, 1971:5).7 Such an occasion arises when the future 
of all groups is uncertain, as it was when Nigeria emerged from military rule 
in 1978 after pogroms, civil war, and a dozen years of dictatorship. At that 
time, there was great fear of renewed ethnic conflict, but no group knew which 
group would be victimized next. One centripetal device that was written into 
the constitution at that time and that has persisted in the current constitution is 
the requirement that a winning candidate for president have support widely 
distributed across two-thirds of the Nigerian states (Constitution of Nigeria, 
1999, art. 134, 2). Versions of this device have been adopted subsequently by 
Indonesia in 2002 and Kenya in 2010—which shows that there is some trade in 
____________ 
6 For the initial claim, see Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A 
Comparative Exploration (1977: 5). 
7 Such occasions may coincide with what Bruce Ackerman calls “constitutional moments”. 
See Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991). 
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centripetal institutions across continents and seas, just as there is of 
consociational institutions. 
Yet, the initial adoption problem is very serious indeed. Dealing 
with conflict-prone societies is difficult, as all three problems dealt with 
here show very well. 
 
C. The Degradation Problem 
The degradation problem can afflict vote-pooling centripetal coalitions. 
It does so because of the familiar aversion of ethnic majorities to limits, whether 
consociational or centripetal, to unfettered ethnic majority rule. For them, the 
good (ruling in a coalition) can be the enemy of the best (ruling alone). 
The Malaysian example serves well to illustrate the degradation 
problem. In Malaysia, as we have seen, the multiethnic Alliance had been 
established before independence in the 1950s. Malays and non-Malays 
(Chinese and Indians) were intermixed in many electoral constituencies. As a 
result, even under a decidedly unconsociational first-past-the-post electoral 
system, Alliance partners (Malay, Chinese, and Indian) in the center of the 
ethnopolitical spectrum, squeezed between Malay and non-Malay extremists 
on the flanks, found it advantageous to pool Malay and non-Malay votes. It 
was a winning combination that led to negotiations for a constitution that 
embodied a compromise on ethnic claims and established the enduring 
principle that ―one-race government‖ was illegitimate. In short, electoral 
exigencies induced politicians to behave in ways that could attract votes from 
both sides of a very contentious ethnic divide. 
Slowly, however, certain underlying conditions changed. Because 
there were more Malay than non-Malay voters, the Malay partner in the 
coalition began to influence the apportionment of constituencies, already 
drawn to advantage rural Malay voters. Chinese voters were increasingly 
packed into large, relatively homogeneous constituencies, where their votes 
would elect fewer candidates (Lim Hong Hai, 1997). Successive 
reapportionments increased the weight of Malay voters. Then, after serious 
ethnic riots following the 1969 elections and a lapse in parliamentary rule of 
nearly two years, the coalition was broadened, reducing the influence of its 
Chinese component, and a new social contract was imposed by a new 
generation of Malay leaders that dramatically changed the balance of ethnic 
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advantage and disadvantage. In the years that followed, it became clear that 
the original conciliatory coalition had been weakened, even though its 
founding parties remained as members. Non-Malays were not disfranchised, 
but they lost their ability to affect a great many decisions of the central 
government, and they increasingly became opposition voters.8 
The story is more complicated than this summary indicates, but the 
increasing malapportionment of constituencies is instructive.9 The Achilles heel 
of electoral incentives as the route to durable interethnic accommodation is the 
weakness of the rule of law in many transitional countries. The establishment of 
nonpartisan electoral commissions that remain impartial and delimit boundaries 
according to neutral, legally specified criteria depends on a vibrant rule of law. 
As the literature on the rule of law shows, the creation and maintenance of legal 
institutions strong enough to stand up to strong politicians tends to follow, 
rather than to precede, the establishment of democracies and to be dependent on 
a particular configuration of political alignments.10 
This is not the place to deal with issues concerning the rule of 
law. It is useful, however, to note how valuable legal institutions can 
be in supporting conciliatory electoral (and other) arrangements for 
intergroup accommodation. In some states with independent and 
____________ 
8 In 2004, the ruling coalition’s Chinese and Indian components won 40 seats. By 2008, this 
number was reduced to 18; by 2013, to only 11 seats. One result of disaffection was the growth of a 
strong Chinese opposition party that eventually was able to coalesce with a Malay opposition party and 
a smaller multiethnic party led by former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim. This new interethnic 
coalition was able to benefit from vote pooling that led in 2008 to opposition victories in several states in 
which Chinese votes were crucial. In 2013, the opposition coalition lost the national election but won 
more votes than the ruling coalition. Gerrymandering of seats made the difference in the outcome. For 
details of the 2013 election, see Bridget Welsh (2013: 136–50). For a careful study of Malaysian 
gerrymandering, see Kai Ostwald (2013: 521–32). 
9 The ability of the ruling coalition to delimit constituency boundaries sometimes led (after 
elections in which Malay support declined) to a proliferation of ethnically mixed constituencies 
apportioned to favor the coalition. See Lee Hock Guan, “Steadily Amplified Rural Votes Decide 
Malaysian Elections”, ISEAS Perspective, no. 34, Singapore, 6 June 2013. It should be noted that 
electoral incentives for intergroup accommodation cannot be diminished by constituency 
malapportionment if the incentives are lodged in an electoral system for a president who is elected in 
one nationwide constituency; but, of course, presidential electoral systems can be altered. 
10 See, for example, Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional 
Courts in Asian Cases (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); J. Mark Ramseyer, “The 
Puzzling (In) dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach”, Journal of Legal Studies 23 (June 
1994: 721-48). I have dealt with rule of- aw issues in Constitutional Change and Democracy in 
Indonesia, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013: 233–46). 
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respected constitutional courts, it is possible to confide approval or 
review of new constituency boundaries to those courts, some of which 
already have jurisdiction to con-firm electoral results. In many 
countries, however, constitutional courts have not managed to secure 
independence and respect, and in those the problem will remain. 
When electoral commissions and courts are unable to withstand 
pressure, centripetal arrangements can be vulnerable to slippage.  
It is also useful to recall that, just as majorities prefer majority rule to 
consociational guarantees, so too do they prefer untrammeled majority rule to 
centripetal regimes that provide minorities with the power to negotiate 
compromise outcomes in arenas of ethnic policy. When centripetal regimes 
degrade, minority disaffection can rise to dangerous heights.11 
 
D. No Exit? The Immobilism Problem 
The third problem is the inverse of the second. If centripetal 
arrangements are sometimes subject to degradation, consociational 
arrangements can be very difficult to modify. And modification is often de-sired. 
Recall that consociational regimes can be established only when majorities are, at 
least momentarily, weak. The inclusive government prescribed by 
consociational theory, coupled with the minority veto, is highly likely to produce 
the same majority resentment as may be present in centripetal regimes that are 
committed to compromise outcomes with minority participants. 
An interethnic arrangement of any sort allows ethnic demands and 
counterdemands to be made, but a consociational dispensation allows each 
participating group to block the claims and demands of other groups. The 
result is a system frequently immobilized with respect to the very questions 
the agreement was made to settle. The stalemate, inability to get things done, 
and serious immobilism that can follow give rise to a desire on the part of 
majorities to modify the consociational agreement. 
The need to renegotiate such arrangements, loosen them up, or make 
a transition to a different dispensation altogether has frequently been 
____________ 
11 Or members of a minority group can emigrate, as many Malaysian Chinese have 
and as many Fijian Indians did after a putsch unseated a multiethnic government that had come 
to power under a centripetal electoral system in 1999. 
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recognized. Some writers say that consociational guarantees are suitable for 
calming a conflict in times of crisis or civil war, but once tranquility has been 
achieved—and especially if immobilism sets in—it ought to be possible to 
move to other institutions. Timothy D. Sisk speaks of the ―obsolescing pact‖ 
(Timothy Sisk, 2010: 10). Minority guarantees, he says, come into conflict with 
the need for a strong center, and they create instability; they may reify ethnic 
identity and foster ―the inflexibility of representation‖ that is ―the hallmark‖ of 
peace agreements (Timothy Sisk, 2010: 10). Echoing Pierre du Toit’s call for 
―post-settlement settlements‖ (Pierre du Toit, 2003: 104-18), sisk advocates the 
renegotiation of consociational settlements but confesses that it is difficult to 
specify the means to accomplish this. Many commentators suggest that 
consociations tend to rigidify conflicts and do not lend themselves to 
renegotiation. Most agree that consociational institutions, once established, are 
sticky. The wish for a possibility of a transition away from them has often been 
expressed, but no one has yet specified the location of the exit.12 
For the same reasons that majorities are reluctant to surrender power 
to a consociational regime, so too are they sorely tempted to abandon the 
consociational scheme. They continue to prefer majority rule or a civic—that 
is, wholly nonethnic—dispensation in which the majority will hold sway. 
Second-generation majority-group leaders, who did not create the agreement 
in the first place, may be impatient with it (Philip G. Roeder, 2005: 38–39 and 
Eric Nordlinger, 1972). Discontent with the consociational scheme has been 
greater among majorities than among minorities in Northern Ireland, 
Belgium, Bosnia (where Bosniaks are at least a large plurality, perhaps now a 
majority), and Burundi. If there is a change in the balance of power existing 
at the time the agreement was made, leaders of the majority may opt out, as 
Greek Cypriots did in 1963. 
More often than not, escape is not so easy, because majorities will not 
be willing to incur the high costs that might attend attempts to leave the 
____________ 
12 Under quite idiosyncratic conditions, South Africa’s interim constitution of 1994 
accorded minorities a few consociational guarantees, subject to what was effectively a sunset 
clause. Under ordinary circumstances, when minorities are strong enough to demand such 
guarantees, they will not agree to sunset clauses. 
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arrangements. Merely because an agreement has produced immobilism and 
discontent does not mean that its support is as decayed as its institutions are 
feeble. Ineffective consociational dispensations do not simply wither away or 
give rise to more sustainable arrangements. There may be a strong 
constellation of interests holding the consociational status quo together. For 
one thing, minorities tend to be attached to the consociational bargain. They 
may begin to have doubts about the bargain they made, as some Catholic 
nationalists have had in Northern Ireland, especially after the moderates of 
both groups who crafted the consociational deal were displaced at the center of 
power by more extreme parties, or as certain Bosnian Serbs and Croats have 
had, or as certain Walloons in Belgium have had. Yet they may fear the 
consequences of alternative arrangements more than they dislike the 
stalemated status quo. In Bosnia, the alternatives proposed from time to 
time—in 1999, in 2006, three times in 2008–09, and then again in 2013—involve 
deviations from strictly consociational institutions. Such changes as a dilution 
of veto powers, an end to exclusively ethnic representation, or a different 
electoral system might weaken the hold of minority representatives on their 
voters and on the system. If those minority representatives have an option of 
resorting to armed force against changes deemed unfavorable, the possibility 
of violence is a strong disincentive for a dissatisfied majority to change. 
That disincentive is likely to prove quite persuasive to the surrounding 
support system of external actors who have a stake in the arrangements, a stake 
usually acquired because they encouraged or cajoled the parties to the original 
agreement or even underwrote it. The British were wholeheartedly behind 
Turkish Cypriot claims to a consociational regime in 1959–60. They also had no 
objection to the internal aspects of the Northern Ireland Agreement negotiated in 
1998. The U.S. government drafted the Dayton guarantees that were demanded 
by Serbs and Croats in 1995. The European Union and the United States pushed 
for consociational guarantees for Albanians in Macedonia in 2001 in order to end 
an Albanian insurrection; and the European Union, following the lead of the 
OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, generally pressured East 
European states to provide an array of consociational guarantees, sometimes 
including a minority veto, for their minorities (Wilkinson, 2005). In a series of 
negotiations for the reunification of Cyprus, the United Nations in 2004 pushed 
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very hard for watertight guarantees, decades after such guarantees had 
produced stalemate, rejection, war, and occupation. Greek Cypriot voters 
rejected the Annan Plan in a referendum in 2004. 
This account does not include the states in Africa in which 
insurrections were to be ended by consociational accords to place rebels in 
government, though those accords might fail to produce durable peace, as in 
Rwanda in 1993, Angola in 1994, or Côte d’Ivoire in 2003. When they acted as 
mediators, Europeans and Americans (and, for that matter, South Africans) 
insisted on the very institutions abroad that they disdained at home. 
In short, there tends to be strong external support for consociational 
arrangements, although there are exceptions. In Bosnia, the Dayton Accords 
fell out of favor with Western powers within a few years, for reasons that are 
beyond the scope of this article but have much to do with which groups are 
in favor and which are not. While no fundamental change was contemplated 
in Northern Ireland even after protracted lapses in the functioning of the 
Good Friday Agreement, and while at the same time the Annan Plan—
consociational to the nth degree—was being pressed on Cypriots, Europeans 
and Americans were telling Bosnians that such arrangements were 
unsuitable for them and not in conformity with entry into the European 
Union. This was done not-withstanding the presence of a deadlocked 
consociational government in Brussels, at the heart of Europe. 
The net result of these external preferences was that Bosnia’s 
minorities would have no international support if they resisted change, while 
other consociations, however deadlocked, would have support not only from 
minorities inside but also from friends outside. Even so, Bosnians were 
resistant to several proposals for vote-pooling electoral systems in the late 
1990s, then to open Western favoritism toward political parties deemed to be 
moderate on ethnic issues in 2000 and after, and finally to various plans to 
reduce the redundancy of group guarantees and the complexity of Bosnian 
institutions during the next decade. 
 
E. Can the Stalemates Be Broken? 
Like Bosnia’s arrangements, Northern Ireland’s consociational 
dispensation generally helped to keep the peace, but it failed to deal 
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with contentious ethnic issues that the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 
had specified for resolution. From about 2007 onward, Burundi also 
was largely peaceful, a remarkable achievement given its history of 
brutal violence, but the Hutu led government increasingly chafed 
under the consociational restraints that had been imposed in 2005.13 
Also peaceful was Belgium, which exhibited deadlock as great as 
that encountered by any other consociational regime and solved that 
problem, in a manner of speaking, by resorting to more and more 
government in the monoethnic regions of Flanders and Wallonia and the 
80-percent Francophone region of Brussels, and less and less government at 
the center. In Belgium, as in the other cases, the restless group is the 
majority (in this case, Flemish), which is more constrained by the regime of 
guarantees. No one seemed able to break the shackles of immobilism. 
Interestingly enough, as the immobilism of consociational institutions 
sets in, in nearly every case some proposals for change are geared toward 
centripetal institutions, especially vote-pooling electoral systems. In the late 
1990s, the International Crisis Group published two proposals for electoral 
systems in Bosnia that would allow voters to vote for candidates from groups 
other than their own and encourage candidates to seek such votes. The 
proposals had technical problems that would have precluded their adoption in 
the form proposed, but in 1998 the international Peace Implementation 
Council for Bosnia had declared its interest in a new electoral law to promote a 
―multiethnic political process‖ by encouraging parties to take account of 
interests beyond those of the groups they principally represented. Ultimately, 
efforts in this direction came to naught when the director of the OSCE office in 
Bosnia opted for a system of open-list proportional representation. 
A proposal for a centripetal system, but with guaranteed 
proportionality, was also made—and ignored—during what turned out to be a 
desultory review of Northern Ireland’s stalemated Good Friday Agreement in 
2003, and renewed negotiations for a Cyprus agreement after the failure of the 
Annan Plan featured a proposal for the election of some Turkish officials by 
Greek voters, and vice versa—a cross-voting idea that is not the same as a true 
____________ 
13 For updates on Burundi, I am indebted to some email exchanges with Dr. Stef 
Vandeginste of the University of Antwerp. The interpretation, however, is mined alone. 
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vote-pooling system, but that stems from a centripetal impulse. Turkish-Cypriot 
voters rejected the idea at the polls in 2010. The Pavia Group in Belgium, a 
biethnic organization of scholars interested in preventing the disintegration of 
the state, has presented a proposal for ―a federal constituency,‖ in which 10 
percent of the Belgian parliament would be elected by all voters, as opposed to the 
current system in which constituencies are intraregional and intra ethnic. Similarly, 
a member of the Pavia Group has proposed a ―multiple proportional vote‖ that 
would have strongly centripetal features. Among today’s strongly consociational 
regimes, only Burundi has not considered a centripetal electoral system. 
In no case, however, has a centripetal electoral system been 
grafted onto a consociational political system, so there is no way to see 
how it would have worked. (The hybrid systems of Lebanon and 
Macedonia provide mixed messages about mixed prescriptions.) All of 
the inhibitions that were described for the initial adoption problem—
and more—hinder this kind of change. 
There are two states, however, that had consociational regimes and 
managed to become majoritarian democracies, but their experiences do not 
point the way forward for deadlocked consociations that are ethnically 
based. Both in the Netherlands and in Austria, there was ―pillarization‖ of 
the society, cradle-to-grave compartmentalization. In both cases, the 
cleavages were based on religion and social class, and classical consociational 
methods were employed to manage them (except that the Netherlands never 
had a grand coalition) (Rudy Andeweg and Galen A. Irwin: 2005, Kurt 
Richard Luther and Wolfgang C. Muller (eds.), 1992: 1–44, 201-06, Ruud 
Koole and Hans Daalder, 2002: 23–43). 
In both cases, however, social change after World War II, especially 
the growth of an urban service sector and a white-collar middle class, 
coupled with secularization of the society and the erosion of what had been 
strong religious affiliations, resulted in a crumbling of the pillars. The 
underlying social compartments, with all their associated organizations, 
simply broke down. With the abatement of group conflict due to profound 
social and economic changes, social circles were no longer exclusive, and 
voters were freed to vote outside what had been quasi ascriptive party 
allegiances to which they had previously been tied. The result was ordinary 
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majority rule and voter volatility among parties, without grand coalitions, 
vetoes, or any other relic of consociationalism. 
None of this will help those countries in which divisions are strongly 
ethnic, as in Belgium or Burundi, or even ethnonational, as in Northern 
Ireland and Bosnia. These countries have birth-based divisions that are more 
firmly embedded than those based on the mutable religious or class 
affiliations of most of the Western world. For change to be effective in 
ethnically divided consociations, it needs to take place at the level of formal 
political institutions, not at the level of the society in general. 
Are there, then any sources of change that seem plausible for 
immobile consociational regimes? Adding a centripetal electoral system 
might have a serious effect, but if parties and politicians with strong ethnic 
orientations have the whip hand, moderate ethnically based parties and 
politicians may fear to join together across the ethnic divide. In such cases, it 
is likely that they will be accused of selling out group interests. Some such 
dilemma seems to characterize the predicament of moderate Protestant 
unionist and Catholic nationalist politicians in Northern Ireland. They 
periodically make noises about coalescing but are unable to do so because 
they are flanked by larger ethnic parties that are less inclined to compromise. 
Laurent de Briey has perhaps summed the problem up best: 
“The only hope of seeing the adoption of [a conciliatory electoral system] seriously 
debated among political parties [in Belgium] would be if this reform were advocated 
by moderate people inside all of the main par-ties. Those people could be motivated by 
their common opposition to an electoral system which, fostering ethnic radicalisation, 
entails their minoritisation in their respective parties. More realistically, we may 
expect one party to promote [such a system] in order to dissociate itself from the 
ethnic discourses of the other parties” (Laurent de Briey, 2005: 19-20). 
This does seem to suggest possible paths to change, but although there 
are moderates in all such societies, none seems able to break the mold.14 
The most likely route to serious change for a stalled consociation lies 
in some unpredictable crisis not necessarily related to the conflict that 
produced the consociational regime—a shock that makes stalemate 
____________ 
14 In Bosnia, however, courts have made some incremental changes in the 
constitution. For an informed discussion, see Christopher McCrudden and Brendan O’Leary, 
Courts and Consociations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013: 42-45). 
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intolerable, neutralizes minority objections, and renders quick action 
necessary. This is typical of agenda-setting events (John W. Kingdon, 1995), 
and it provides an advantage to those who have solutions ready and are 
merely waiting for problems to develop that can make their solutions 
attractive. Like most events that trigger major institutional changes, this kind 
of event may have too much urgency to allow much deliberation. 
This brief tour of three neglected problems of ethnic accommodation 
and democracy provides no easy answers. Rather, it suggests prospects for a 
great deal of stasis in remedying problems of ethnic conflict.  
The first problem, concerning the difficulty of adopting any 
accommodative institutions in the first instance, is so intractable that many 
troubled states in need of conciliatory institutions and inclined toward 
democracy will have great difficulty adopting either consociational or 
centripetal institutions. Instead, they are likely to opt for a form of democracy 
to which they are accustomed—namely, straightforward majority rule with 
minority rights. Such a choice is likely to disappoint on both counts. Without 
electoral incentives for conciliatory behavior, majority rule will become ethnic-
majority rule. Minority rights will be inadequately enforced, because the 
majority will be likely to control the courts. 
Some states may borrow an odd device here or there, perhaps after a 
crisis is brought to compromise by an international mediator whose only interest 
is to restore the peace. Some of these states may stumble upon institutions that 
aid in conciliation; most will not. Many attempts to reach power-sharing 
agreements fail altogether, and an authoritarian regime of ethnic domination 
may set in, with or without a lapse (or a relapse) into civil war. Even where 
power-sharing institutions are adopted, majorities will generally chafe under 
them. No constitutional engineering is fail-safe, even if it can be accomplished 
initially. Actors will seek to reverse conditions they find to be unfavorable. 
The second problem, involving the degradation of centripetal electoral 
institutions by a variety of majority manipulations that cannot be checked by a 
judiciary enforcing political bargains, has no easier answer than the first. Making 
bargains more explicit and public is, perhaps, one way to make them harder to 
break, but even then, as the conditions underlying them change and the returns 
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to the parties from them prove to be uneven over time, there is no assurance that 
they will not be altered in an ethnically exclusive, majoritarian direction. 
The third problem, entailing the possibility of escape from 
consociational immobilism, seems very difficult. We have considered five of 
the most prominent and complete consociational systems that have so far been 
adopted. In one, Cyprus, the majority terminated the arrangement within 
three years of its inception, with disastrous results. Subsequently, each of the 
sides in turn has refused to become entangled in another arrangement to 
reunify Cyprus. The other four countries subsist in various forms of stalemate, 
so far relatively mild in the cases of Northern Ireland and Burundi, very severe 
in Belgium and Bosnia. The route to amendment looks blocked. If centripetal 
institutions may be in-sufficiently sticky, over time consociational institutions 
tend to become excessively sticky. 
Proponents of consociational and centripetal measures to achieve 
intergroup accommodation in a democratic setting have been too sanguine 
about the prospects for adopting them, for maintaining them when majorities 
can find ways of altering agreed arrangements, and for changing them when 
particularly rigid arrangements lead to stalemate and majority restlessness. 
Many states that need conciliatory institutions will not get them; others will not 
keep them if majorities are able to break out of them; and still others will not 
change them when stalemate indicates that change is necessary. 
 
F. Conclusion 
A quick but incomplete enumeration should suffice to indicate the 
obstacles to adoption of either consociational or centripetal institutions. First, 
there are asymmetric preferences. Majorities want majority rule; minorities 
want guarantees against majority rule. Consequently, minorities may prefer 
consociation; majorities do not. So a consociational regime can be adopted 
only when majorities (or large pluralities) are momentarily weak, often after 
periods of extended violence. At a later stage, when majorities regain their 
strength, they may overthrow it, as Greek Cypriots did in 1963 and as the 
Hutu in Burundi might be inclined to do now. Second, there is general risk-
aversion. Ethnic politics is a high-stakes game, and there are strong 
inclinations to stay with what is familiar. 
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Third, negotiators do not come to the table innocent and naked. They 
have biases that rule in some models and rule out others. Often they favor 
institutions prevailing in the most successful democracies, which generally 
do not suffer from the most severe ethnic problems, or models derived from 
an ex-colonial power. There are also historical biases that induce decision 
makers to avoid repeating institutional choices that they associate with past 
mistakes, even though their reading of history is contestable or conditions 
may have changed. Biases narrow choices. 
The first problem, concerning the difficulty of adopting any 
accommodative institutions in the first instance, is so intractable that many 
troubled states in need of conciliatory institutions and inclined toward 
democracy will have great difficulty adopting either consociational or 
centripetal institutions. Instead, they are likely to opt for a form of democracy 
to which they are accustomed—namely, straightforward majority rule with 
minority rights. Such a choice is likely to disappoint on both counts. Without 
electoral incentives for conciliatory behavior, majority rule will become ethnic-
majority rule. Minority rights will be inadequately enforced, because the 
majority will be likely to control the courts. 
The second problem, involving the degradation of centripetal electoral 
institutions by a variety of majority manipulations that cannot be checked by a 
judiciary enforcing political bargains, has no easier answer than the first. Making 
bargains more explicit and public is, perhaps, one way to make them harder to 
break, but even then, as the conditions underlying them change and the returns 
to the parties from them prove to be uneven over time, there is no assurance that 
they will not be altered in an ethnically exclusive, majoritarian direction. 
The third problem, entailing the possibility of escape from 
consociational immobilism, seems very difficult. We have considered five of 
the most prominent and complete consociational systems that have so far been 
adopted. In one, Cyprus, the majority terminated the arrangement within 
three years of its inception, with disastrous results. Subsequently, each of the 
sides in turn has refused to become entangled in another arrangement to 
reunify Cyprus. The other four countries subsist in various forms of stalemate, 
so far relatively mild in the cases of Northern Ireland and Burundi, very severe 
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in Belgium and Bosnia. The route to amendment looks blocked. If centripetal 
institutions may be in-sufficiently sticky, over time consociational institutions 
tend to become excessively sticky. 
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